Written for the people who have to answer for this decision: security engineers, architects, and auditors evaluating whether a database threat-detection product can itself be trusted with a privileged view into your data estate. This is the engineering substance behind the trust claims — not a marketing summary of them.
The core design constraint, stated plainly: DBSheriff must reduce your risk, not add to it. Every architectural decision below traces back to that constraint.
DBSheriff is a set of containers on a single Linux host that you provision and control — on-premises, or a VM inside your own AWS, GCP, or Azure account. There is no multi-tenant DBSheriff cloud service in the data path at all.
Because query text, identities, schema names, and event records never leave your perimeter, DBSheriff does not become a data processor under GDPR, does not require a HIPAA Business Associate Agreement, and does not expand PCI-DSS network scope. These are direct, structural consequences of the architecture, not a policy promise layered on top of it.
On every monitored database, DBSheriff uses several distinct credentials, each scoped to exactly what its job requires, rather than one broad administrative login.
| Function | Typical scope |
|---|---|
| Monitoring | Read access to the engine's own monitoring/audit views only. On most engines, this credential cannot read the contents of your actual data tables — it observes query metadata, not query results. |
| Termination | Just enough privilege to cancel or terminate a specific running statement or session — not general administrative rights. |
| Account locking | Just enough privilege to disable a login and restore it — a separate, narrower credential than the one used for termination. |
| Classification & posture scanning | Read access scoped to what's needed to sample table/column metadata and check configuration — not a standing grant to read sensitive rows. |
Where a platform supports it, DBSheriff uses key-pair or token-based authentication in preference to a static password. Every stored credential is encrypted at rest using industry-standard symmetric encryption, decrypted only in-memory at the moment it's needed, and never logged or written to disk in plaintext.
Captured statement text is scanned and redacted for embedded secrets — passwords, tokens, connection strings that happen to appear inline in a query — before it is ever written to DBSheriff's own audit storage. What's stored is evidence for your team, not a second place your secrets can leak from.
A security product's own evidence is only as good as your ability to trust it hasn't been tampered with. DBSheriff's decision records — every kill, every lock, every posture finding — are written to database tables with append-only enforcement at the storage layer itself, not just as an application-level convention.
If you find a security issue in DBSheriff, we want to know before anyone else does. Report it to info@sunaidata.com with as much detail as you can provide. We take every report seriously, will work with you to understand and reproduce the issue, and will keep you informed as we address it. Please give us a reasonable window to fix a genuine issue before any public disclosure.
We'll walk your security team through the architecture against your actual environment and answer what's specific to your review.
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